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INTRODUCTION 
Professor Secunda ably documents the approaches of OECD 
nations to protecting wage and pension claims in insolvency, 
particularly priorities and guarantee schemes.  His Article will 
therefore be an important resource to employment, bankruptcy, and 
international law.  The Article should be useful not only to academics, 
practitioners, government agencies, NGOs, and labor organizations, 
but also to law reformers.  Professor Secunda correctly notes that the 
United States has longstanding guarantee schemes for unemployment 
and retirement income, but its bankruptcy priorities for employment-
based claims are not particularly strong.  His thesis is that the United 
States—with a “Limited Model Two” system of guarantees and 
                                                                                                                                                    
* Chief Counsel, Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC); Adjunct Professor, 
Georgetown University Law Center.  Any opinions expressed are my own, and do 
not represent the views of the PBGC, GULC, or any other organization.  I gratefully 
acknowledge the assistance of Damarr Butler, Attorney, PBGC, in preparing this 
Response.  I also gratefully acknowledge the comments of Gail Sevin, John Hanley, 
James O’Neill, James Armbruster, and Nathaniel Rayle.  I am responsible for any 
errors. 
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priorities1—can learn from Canada’s recently enacted Wage Earner 
Protection Program Act (WEPPA).2  WEPPA provides a government 
guarantee of unpaid wages and related amounts, and a super-priority 
“charge” on debtor assets for wages, vacation pay, and pension 
contributions in Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA) proceedings 
(liquidations and smaller company reorganizations).3 
For the past twenty-five years, I have represented the Pension 
Benefit Guaranty Corporation (PBGC), the nation’s pension insurer, 
practicing both employee benefits and bankruptcy law.  At 
Georgetown University Law Center (GULC), where I have been an 
adjunct professor for more than twenty years, I have taught both 
pension insurance law and comparative bankruptcy law.  For the past 
year, I have served on the Labor and Benefits Advisory Committee to 
the American Bankruptcy Institute’s Commission to Study the 
Reform of Chapter 11 (Commission). 
My experience is therefore with collective and institutional 
solutions to insolvency problems.  The PBGC itself administers an 
insolvency system for terminated pension plans,4 in addition to 
participating in major corporate bankruptcies.  Based on that 
experience, I believe that keeping businesses and pension plans going 
despite bankruptcy is where we should focus our efforts.5 
As documented by Professor James Wooten in his study, Political 
History,6 ERISA is the result of compromise, between workforce 
                                                                                                                                                    
 1. His taxonomy, Model One (Bankruptcy Priority, Little or No Guarantee), 
Model Two (Robust) (Bankruptcy Priority and Guarantee for Both Pensions and 
Wages), Model Two (Limited) (Bankruptcy Priority and Guarantee for either 
Pensions or Wages), and Model Three (No or Limited Bankruptcy Priority, But 
Some Form of Guarantee) derives from GORDON JOHNSON, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-
OPERATION & DEV., INSOLVENCY AND SOCIAL PROTECTION: EMPLOYEE 
ENTITLEMENTS IN THE EVENT OF EMPLOYER BANKRUPTCY (2006), available at 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/38184691.pdf 
 2. Paul M. Secunda, An Analysis of the Treatment of Employee Pension and 
Wage Claims in Insolvency and Under Guarantee Schemes in OECD Countries: 
Comparative Law Lessons for Detroit and the United States, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 
867, 876 (2014). 
 3. See generally Wage Earner Protection Program Act, S.C. 2005, c. 47, s. 1 
(Can.); see also Secunda supra note 2 at 876–77. 
 4. See Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 
§§ 1301–1461 (2012). 
 5. Fiona Stewart argues that there is great leverage in strong funding rules, curbs 
against moral hazard and adverse selection, and proper enforcement tools. See 
generally Fiona Stewart, Benefit Security Pension Fund Guarantee Schemes (Org. 
for Econ. Co-operation & Dev., Working Paper No. 5, 2007), available at 
www.oecd.org/dataoecd/25/52/34770674.pdf. 
 6. JAMES A. WOOTEN, THE EMPLOYEE RETIREMENT INCOME SECURITY ACT OF 
1974: A POLITICAL HISTORY (2004). 
2014] RESPONSE TO PAUL SECUNDA 1029 
management and worker protection objectives, and between labor 
and tax policy, among other things.  ERISA is also the product of 
what we now call Rahm’s Rule, “You never want a serious crisis to go 
to waste.”7  National pension reform was inspired by the Studebaker 
shutdown in 1963.8  And Congress rushed to enact ERISA in the 
summer of 1974, believing that it would spend the rest of the session 
on the Nixon impeachment proceedings.9 
In the bankruptcy area, I recommend an equally important book, 
Professor David Skeel’s Debt’s Dominion,10 tracing the history of 
bankruptcy laws in the United States and the political forces behind 
them.  For those familiar with modern credit-bid proceedings, Skeel’s 
account of SEC Chairman William O. Douglas’s attempt to curb 
similar practices in the 1938 Chandler Act11 evokes déjà vu.12 
At times, it seems that Congress no sooner acts than the seams 
begin to open, leading to demand for fresh reforms, sometimes in the 
opposite direction.  For example, at least in retrospect, some said that 
the Pension Protection Act of 2006’s (the PPA’s)13 funding reforms 
were inadequate.14  But just as PPA took effect, the Great Recession 
began.  In short order, Congress enacted temporary relief provisions, 
and followed with additional relief provisions in the next several 
years.15  The debate continues on what funding regime is necessary to 
adequately protect pensions without driving employers out of the 
system.16 
                                                                                                                                                    
 7. In Crisis, Opportunity for Obama, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21, 2008, 
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB122721278056345271 (quoting Rahm Emanuel, 
White House Chief of Staff). 
 8. See James A. Wooten, “The Most Glorious Story of Failure in the Business”: 
The Studebaker-Packard Corporation and the Origins of ERISA, 49 BUFF. L. REV. 
683, 683 (2001) [hereinafter Wooten, Most Glorious Story]; see also WOOTEN, supra 
note 6, at 260–62.  This illustrates John Kingdon’s “policy streams” model, that when 
the problem stream, the policy stream, and the politics stream flow together, a 
window opens for policy entrepreneurs. See JOHN W. KINGDON, AGENDAS, 
ALTERNATIVES, AND PUBLIC POLICIES (1995); see also Wooten, Most Glorious Story, 
supra at 725–26. 
 9. See WOOTEN, supra note 6, at 260–62. 
 10. DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT’S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN 
AMERICA (2001). 
 11. Id. at 90–127. 
 12. See infra note 36 and accompanying text. 
 13. Pension Protection Act, Pub. L. 109–280, 120 Stat. 780 (2006). 
 14. See e.g., David D. Hanss, Too Little, Too Late: Why the Pension Protection 
Act of 2006 Will Not Live Up to Its Name, 45 HOUS. L. REV. 509, 540 (2008). 
 15. See e.g., Worker, Retiree, and Employer Recovery Act, Pub. L. No. 110-458, 
122 Stat. 5092 (2008). 
 16. See Hanss, supra note 14, at 549–51; see also Mark Miller, Do No Harm: 
Protecting Retirees in Shaky Pension Plans, REUTERS, June 26, 2013, available at 
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Similarly, the Bankruptcy Abuse, Prevention, and Consumer 
Protection Act of 2005 (BAPCPA)17 was seen as favoring creditors 
and hindering reorganization due to such measures as shorter 
exclusive periods for the debtor to propose a reorganization plan and 
solicit votes.  Like PPA, BAPCPA was enacted shortly before the 
Great Recession.  As demand slackened, bankruptcies increased, 
though in some cases distressed companies could not obtain DIP 
financing, suggesting that economic conditions were more influential 
than BAPCPA’s lender-driven reforms.18 
Last year, the American Bankruptcy Institute (ABI)19 formed its 
Commission, based on the concern that “the use of secured credit, the 
growth of distressed-debt markets and other externalities have 
affected the effectiveness of the current Bankruptcy Code.”20  The 
Commission’s Labor and Benefits Advisory Committee includes 
                                                                                                                                                    
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/26/us-column-miller-seniordebt-
idUSBRE95P15T20130626; Stephen Miller, President Signs Pension Funding Relief 
Measure, SOC’Y FOR HUM. RESOURCE MGMT. (July 6, 2012), 
http://www.shrm.org/hrdisciplines/benefits/articles/pages/reliefmeasure.aspx. 
 17. Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (2005). 
 18. See John J. Rapisardi, TalkingPoint: US Bankruptcy, FINANCIERWORLDWIDE 
(Oct. 2009), http://www.financierworldwide.com/article_printable.php?id=6835.  
(“Driven by the global credit crisis and low consumer demand, the US bankruptcy 
market has become increasingly active over the past 18 months, with commercial 
bankruptcies having jumped 42 percent in July 2009 over the same period last year. It 
is unlikely that the ‘worst’ is over. The fortunes of many industries—particularly 
retail, hospitality, aviation and automotive—are tied to US consumer spending, 
which basically went ‘on strike’ after the financial markets crashed in late 2008.  Yet 
many businesses elected against filing for Chapter 11 because DIP financing was not 
available or they had no exit strategy.” (quoting Aaron L. Hammer, Partner, 
Freeborn & Peters LLP)).  Despite a wave of bankruptcy filings during the 
Recession, a considerable number of pension plan sponsors successfully reorganized 
and kept their pensions between 2009 and 2011.  Putting aside the special cases of 
General Motors and Chrysler, they included major auto parts, chemical, financial 
services, food, media, retail, and packaging companies. See, e.g., JOSH GOTBAUM, 
PENSION BENEFIT GUAR. CORP., 2010 PBGC ANNUAL REPORT (2010), available at 
https://www.pbgc.gov/docs/2010_annual_report.pdf (“If a company enters 
bankruptcy, PBGC becomes an active advocate, urging reorganizing sponsors to keep 
their plans if possible.  In FY 2010, PBGC’s efforts ensured that plans sponsored by 
LyondellBasell Industries, Smurfit-Stone, Lear Corp., and more than 30 other 
companies survived Chapter 11 bankruptcies.  Their 250,000 employees and retirees 
continue to enjoy their full benefits, and are still protected by PBGC insurance 
coverage.”). 
 19. The ABI’s mission includes providing Congress and the public with unbiased 
analysis of bankruptcy issues. See About ABI, AM. BANKR. INST., 
http://www.abiworld.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=About_ABI (last visited Mar. 
15, 2014). 
 20. Purpose of the Commission, AM. BANKR. INST., http://commission.abi.org/ 
purpose-commission (last visited Mar. 15, 2014). 
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management and union practitioners, academics, and a sitting 
bankruptcy judge.21 
Though Chapter 11’s treatment of employment and pension claims 
are fairly well known,22 and law reform efforts have begun, treatment 
of “legacy” costs in Chapter 9 is still relatively untested.  The Detroit 
bankruptcy might become an example of treating a pension program 
as a restructuring project in its own right.  The Emergency Manager 
froze pension plans for certain city workers (though the decision has 
been stayed), intending to establish a defined contribution plan for 
future service.23  If ERISA applied to governmental plans, that would 
in all likelihood be considered a settlor function (reserved to the 
employer’s business judgment and unreviewable),24 and not a 
violation of the anti-cutback rule.25   But in a municipal bankruptcy, 
the issue is fraught with constitutional and federalism concerns.26 
In one well-known case, a governmental plan sought to reorganize 
under Chapter 11.  The effort failed, as a pension plan is not an entity 
entitled to be a debtor under Chapter 11.27  But reformers have 
already focused on the issue.28 
Professor Secunda’s Article is mainly devoted to private-sector 
plans.  I had suggested that Professor Secunda give more attention to 
                                                                                                                                                    
 21. See Labor and Benefits Issues, AM. BANKR. INST., http://commission.abi.org/ 
node/15 (last visited Mar. 15, 2014). 
 22. See, e.g., DANIEL L. KEATING, BANKRUPTCY AND EMPLOYMENT LAW: 
BANKRUPTCY’S IMPACT ON EMPLOYERS, EMPLOYEES, UNIONS, AND RETIREES (1995). 
 23. See Matt Helms, Orr Issues Stay on Freezing Pensions for Detroit Workers as 
Mediation Continues, DETROIT FREE PRESS, Jan. 6, 2014, http://www.freep.com/ 
article/20140106/NEWS/301060055/Detroit-pension-freeze-Orr; Mary Williams 
Walsh, A Proposal to Freeze Pensions in Detroit, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2013, 
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/09/26/detroit-manager-seeks-to-freeze-pension-
plan. 
 24. See Beck v. PACE Int’l Union, 551 U.S. 96, 101 (2007). 
 25. 29 U.S.C. § 1054(g) (2012). 
 26. See Claire Groden, The Wages of Bankruptcy: Stockton’s Cautionary Tale for 
Detroit, TIME (July 25, 2013), http://nation.time.com/2013/07/25/the-wages-of-
bankruptcy-stocktons-cautionary-tale-for-detroit. 
 27. See Hazel Bradford, Northern Mariana Islands Pension Bankruptcy Bid 
Dismissed, PENSIONS & INVESTMENTS (June 18, 2012), http://www.pionline.com/ 
article/20120618/DAILYREG/120619892; see also In re N. Mariana Islands Ret. 
Fund, No. 12-00003, 2012 WL 8654317, at *1 (D.N. Mar. I. June 13, 2012) (citing 11 
U.S.C. § 109(d) (2012)).  Nor does it appear that a pension plan could be a debtor 
under Chapter 9. See § 109(c)(1). 
 28. See Andrew Dawson, Minutes of ABI Commission, LAB. & BENEFITS 
ADVISORY COMMITTEE (May 24, 2013), available at http://commission.abi.org/sites/ 
default/files/May%2024%202013%20meeting%20minutes.docx, (“Public Employee 
Plans: discussed whether governmental pension plans should be eligible to be debtors 
under either chapter 9 or 11 of the Code.”). 
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some of the factors I have introduced here: protections for ongoing 
pension plans and the insurance system, such as appropriate funding 
rules; the vagaries of legislation, including congressional committee 
jurisdictional issues, compromises made in “must-pass” legislation, 
and Rahm’s Rule; and bankruptcy reform efforts already underway 
on the labor side, such as H.R. 100, and the proceedings of the 
Commission.  Professor Secunda has adopted some of these 
suggestions.  With this response, I add some pragmatic points that 
could be further developed. 
I have no suggestions for Chapter 9 reform.  But despite the 
different reorganization and employment law regimes, it seems 
inevitable that parallels will be drawn between corporate and 
municipal bankruptcies. 
I.  PROTECTIONS FOR ONGOING PLANS AND THE INSURANCE 
SYSTEM 
Professor Secunda treats bankruptcy priority and government 
guarantees as alternatives for protecting worker and retiree claims in 
the event of employer insolvency.  They are not necessarily exclusive, 
he notes, as claims for benefits above the guarantee should not simply 
disappear.29 
Given his focus on “Employment Claims,” with guarantee schemes 
as a potential means for protecting them, Professor Secunda 
appropriately recognizes the need to protect the guarantee scheme 
itself.30  On that issue, Stewart argues that not only is sound funding of 
pensions the primary bulwark, but where funding requirements are 
extremely conservative (as in the Netherlands), there is probably no 
                                                                                                                                                    
 29. In the seminal case on pension insurance under ERISA, the Supreme Court 
said that the employer could disclaim direct liability to its employees beyond amounts 
funded. See Nachman Corp. v. PBGC, 446 U.S. 359, 378–84 (1980).  But some courts 
recognized a claim for benefits beyond the PBGC guarantee under Section 301(a) of 
the Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a)(2014) (providing 
for enforcement of labor agreements). E.g., Murphy v. Heppenstall Co., 635 F.2d 233 
(3d Cir. 1980). 
  In 1986 and 1987, Congress increased PBGC’s claim beyond unfunded 
guaranteed benefits to all unfunded benefit liabilities, and imposed a recovery-
sharing formula on PBGC with respect to non-guaranteed benefits. 29 U.S.C. § 
1322(c) (2012).  The courts have held that these enactments displaced the federal 
common law under Heppenstall and United Steelworkers v. United Engineering, 
Inc., 52 F.3d 1386 (6th Cir. 1995), and that in bankruptcy, any such claim duplicates 
PBGC claims and should be disallowed, e.g., In re Adams Hard Facing Co., 129 B.R. 
662 (W.D. Okla. 1991).  Like workers’ compensation laws, this regime substitutes a 
formulaic administrative recovery for a greater but uncertain recovery in litigation. 
See Secunda, supra note 2, at 894–98. 
 30. Secunda, supra note 2, at 913–15. 
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need for a guarantee scheme.  For those guarantee schemes that do 
exist (in the United States, the United Kingdom, Germany, 
Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, Japan, and Ontario), she argues, it is 
important to guard against the moral hazard of employers’ increasing 
benefits during the spiral toward insolvency; to impose limits on 
benefits guaranteed; to give the regulator or the insurer the necessary 
tools to manage risk (including both investment risk and business risk, 
which are often correlated); to require appropriate premiums without 
forcing good risks to unduly subsidize bad risks; and, to be sure, to 
require sound funding and provide appropriate priority in 
bankruptcy.31 
Professor Secunda also acknowledges the importance of recoveries 
for the guarantee scheme.32  In my experience, however, there is more 
leverage in shoring up pension funding (assuming it does not drive 
good risks out of the system) and deterring unwarranted terminations 
in the first place.33 
Among the ideas that have been proposed are: 
• Requiring a debtor in possession to make minimum funding 
contributions as they fall due, much as Congress has required 
debtors in possession to adhere to collective bargaining 
agreements and to pay retiree medical benefits until modified. 
• Giving unpaid minimum funding contributions falling due post-
petition an administrative priority. 
                                                                                                                                                    
 31. Stewart, supra note 5, at 3–8.  The UAW, which developed the idea of public 
“pension reinsurance” in the 1960s, shared such concerns. See Wooten, Most 
Glorious Story, supra note 8, at 725–26. 
 32. Secunda, supra note 2, at 879–80, 886–90. 
 33. See generally, e.g., In re Philip Servs. Corp., 310 B.R. 802 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 
2004) (debtor asserted that it could not reorganize if it had to continue its pension 
plans, but did just that while the adjudication was pending).  In 2005, Congress 
enacted a “termination premium,” $1250 per participant for three years, payable to 
PBGC.  Congress specified that where the plan terminates during bankruptcy, the 
claim does not arise until after the debtor is discharged. 29 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(7)(B) 
(2012).  As a result, the claim escapes discharge, and is payable one hundred-cents on 
the dollar by the reorganized debtor. See generally PBGC v. Oneida Ltd., 562 F.3d 
154 (2d Cir. 2009).  Congress intended the termination premium to be a factor in 
deterring plan termination, despite bankruptcy. See H.R. REP. NO. 109-276, at 62, 
348–49 (accompanying H.R. 4241) (“termination premiums would be paid for three 
consecutive years once a company emerges from bankruptcy”); see also H.R. REP. 
NO. 109-745, at 33 (discussing H.R. 4); 151 CONG. REC. H11666 (daily ed. Dec. 15, 
2005) (statement of Rep. Souter) (arguing that H.R. 2830 will require “employers 
that terminate their pensions in bankruptcy to pay an annual premium of $1,250 per 
participant to the PBGC for the 3 years after they emerge from bankruptcy”). 
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• Exempting the attachment and perfection of minimum funding 
liens from the automatic stay.34 
Of course, as Professor Secunda notes, there are countervailing 
arguments, such as disruption of the capital markets.35  Indeed, 
lenders and investors are increasingly insisting that companies be 
cleansed of legacy liabilities, often through a “free and clear” asset 
sale under Bankruptcy Code Section 363.36   I expect that other 
scholars will develop the opposing arguments. 
II.  CONGRESSIONAL CONSIDERATIONS 
Stewart notes that pension guarantee funds in the United States, 
Ontario, and the United Kingdom were established to deal with 
political and economic crises attendant to the decline of the industrial 
sector.  Indeed, she argues, pension insurance under ERISA 
intentionally subsidizes failing firms, at the risk of serious market 
distortions.37 
Pensions are the province of four committees of jurisdiction: the 
labor committees (Senate HELP and House Education & 
Workforce), and the “tax writing” committees (Senate Finance and 
House Ways & Means).  Bankruptcy is the province of the Judiciary 
committees.  In arguing for greater priority in bankruptcy, Professor 
                                                                                                                                                    
 34. 11 U.S.C. §§ 362(b), 503(b), 507(a)(2), 1113, 1114 (2012); see ABI COMM’N TO 
STUDY REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, STATEMENT OF HON. JOSHUA GOTBAUM (2013), 
available at http://www.pbgc.gov/documents/Gotbaum-ABI-Statement.pdf. 
 35. Secunda, supra note 2, at 891–92. 
 36. ABI COMM’N TO STUDY REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, supra note 34, at 3–4.  
Private equity firms have recently used section 363 sales to retain control of defaulted 
portfolio companies by “credit-bidding” their secured claims, thereby deterring 
potential competitive bids. Id.  See generally RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. 
Amalgamated Bank, 132 S. Ct. 2065 (2012) (upholding right to credit bid even under 
a debtor-propounded plan of reorganization).  So far, no solution has emerged to 
credit bids by controlling parties, though some unsecured creditors have been able to 
get a portion of the sale proceeds set aside for their claims. See Randall Chase, 
Attorneys Say Coda Bankruptcy Issues Resolved, ASSOCIATED PRESS, May 29, 2013, 
available at http://bigstory.ap.org/article/coda-bonuses-pulled-more-bankruptcy-
issues-remain; ABI COMM’N TO STUDY REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, supra note 34, at 4 
(suggesting that the Commission consider requiring cash bids, that security be 
marked to market, a fifty-percent set-aside, or assumption of pension obligations). 
See generally In re Daufuskie Island Props., 441 B.R. 60, 66 (Bankr. D.S.C. 2010); 
 37. Stewart, supra note 5, at 5–6; see also Brief Amicus Curiae in Support of the 
Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation and Brief Amicus Curiae of Armco, et al., 
Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. LTV Corp., 496 U.S. 633 (1990) (No. 89-390), 1989 
WL 1127271, at *6 (asserting that if LTV is permitted to terminate its pensions plans 
and establish follow-on plans largely replacing uninsured benefits, LTV would have 
an unfair advantage, and other integrated steelmakers would have to pursue the same 
course). 
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Secunda inevitably raises the question whether this can be 
accomplished under ERISA or the Tax Code, or whether, given the 
jurisdictional concerns, it must be done as part of bankruptcy 
reform.38 
As Professor Secunda notes, ERISA provides for a lien and for tax 
treatment for unpaid minimum funding contributions where the 
unpaid balance exceeds $1 million.39  ERISA provides similar 
treatment for the plan’s unfunded benefit liabilities (the difference 
between benefit liabilities and assets), subject to “net worth” limits.40  
By and large, however, the courts have rejected the argument that 
these provisions are effective to establish priority claims in 
bankruptcy.  For example, the Tenth Circuit has held that without an 
“explicit connector” in the Bankruptcy Code itself (rather than in 
ERISA or the Tax Code), those provisions are ineffective in 
attempting to establish a priority tax claim in bankruptcy.41  Thus, one 
might suggest Congress cannot effectively do so without amending 
the Bankruptcy Code.42 
The employer made a similar argument in the Oneida case.43  The 
issue was whether the termination premium is a “claim,” to be treated 
in a plan of reorganization and discharged, or, as ERISA provides, an 
obligation that does not arise until after discharge.  Relying on recent 
Supreme Court decisions on choice of law in bankruptcy, however, 
the Second Circuit held that “we look to the substantive non-
bankruptcy law that gives rise to the debtor’s obligation,” in that case 
the ERISA provisions on when the obligation arises.44 
Oneida represents the emerging mainstream view on choice of law 
in bankruptcy.45  But Professor Secunda is operating in the political 
realm.  The thorny jurisdictional issues in Congress must still be 
reckoned with. 
                                                                                                                                                    
 38. See generally David C. King, The Nature of Congressional Committee 
Jurisdictions, 88 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 48 (1994), available at http://www.unc.edu/~ 
fbaum/teaching/PLSC541_Fall08/king_1994.pdf (arguing that jurisdictional change in 
Congress takes place through bill referral precedents). 
 39. 26 U.S.C. § 430(k) (2012). 
 40. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1362(d), 1368(c)–(e) (2012). 
 41. In re CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 150 F.3d 1293, 1297 (10th Cir. 1998). 
 42. See King, supra note 38, at 48–62. 
 43. Brief of Appellee at 39–40, Pension Ben. Guar. Corporation v. Oneida, Ltd., 
562 F.3d 154 (2d Cir. 2009) (No. 08-2964-bk). 
 44. Oneida, 562 F.3d at 157 (citations omitted). 
 45. See In re U.S. Airways Grp., 296 B.R. 734 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2003) (upholding 
PBGC’s “valuation regulation” for the same reason, that bankruptcy accepts non-
bankruptcy law as the rule of decision unless the Bankruptcy Code specifically 
overrides it). 
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Moreover, the legislative process can take some unexpected turns, 
especially in the case of “must-pass” legislation.  For example, even in 
the “Golden Age of Bi-Partisanship,” 1978–87, at least “25 non-
germane amendments were attached to debt-limit bills . . . including 
allowing voluntary school prayer, banning busing to achieve 
integration and proposing a nuclear freeze.”46  Given that dynamic, a 
legislative advocate would be well advised to have draft provisions 
ready to offer when the opportunity arises.  Professor Secunda may 
therefore want to turn next to preparing legislative text that embodies 
his proposals. 
Finally, Professor Daniel Keating provided some sobering thoughts 
in this area in his testimony before the ABI Commission.  At times an 
advocate of greater priority for employment and pension claims,47 
Keating urges non-bankruptcy solutions, such as advance funding for 
retiree medical benefits.  He cautions that employers can plan around 
“springing priorities,” by using 363 sales to avoid retiree claims; that 
priorities can make reorganization more difficult; that liquidation can 
make priorities irrelevant; and that priorities can deter lending.48  
Though Professor Secunda acknowledges these concerns,49 he has not 
suggested ways to overcome or mitigate them. 
III.  BANKRUPTCY REFORM EFFORTS IN PROCESS 
Though the United States has no guarantee of unpaid wages, both 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and state wage laws provide 
significant penalties for missing a payroll, including double damages 
and personal liability for corporate officers under certain 
circumstances.50  In Chapter 11 cases, courts routinely approve 
payment of wages in “first-day orders,” even for the pay period that 
                                                                                                                                                    
 46. Rich Lowry, The Intransigents, POLITICO (Oct. 3, 2013), 
http://www.politico.com/story/2013/10/the-intransigents-rich-lowry-97759.html. 
 47. See generally Daniel Keating, Chapter 11’s New Ten-Ton Monster: The 
PBGC and Bankruptcy, 77 MINN. L. REV. 803 (1993). 
 48. Daniel Keating, Some Lessons for Congress to Ponder About the Labor-
Bankruptcy Intersection: Hearing Before the ABI Commission (June 7, 2013) 
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://commission.abi.org/sites/default/files/ 
statements/07jun2013/ABI_Testimony_Oral_Remarks.pdf; see also The Fruits of 
Labor: Worker Priorities in Bankruptcy, 35 ARIZ. L. REV. 905, 917–18 (1993) 
(arguing for unionized employees to use their natural leverage, rather than seek 
legislative reform on bankruptcy priorities). 
 49. Secunda, supra note 2, at 891–92. 
 50. 29 U.S.C. § 216 (2012); see e.g., N.Y. LAB. LAW §§ 191, 197, 198 (McKinney 
2009). 
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spans the petition date.51  And post-petition wages have an express 
administrative priority.52 
In a reorganization, therefore, employees are likely most 
concerned not with being paid for work performed but with keeping 
their jobs, as Professor Secunda seems to acknowledge.53  In a sale to 
a strategic buyer, redundancies may result in headcount reductions.  
Even in an internal reorganization, rationalization of the business 
may result in downsizing.  In any case, the debtor may seek to reduce 
wages and benefits, and modify manning requirements and other 
work rules.54  I therefore wonder whether a wage guarantee fund, as 
under Canada’s WEPPA, is as important as Professor Secunda 
suggests.55  In the area of pay, Professor Secunda might better focus 
on severance pay, which is generally not considered a priority.56 
More broadly, as Professor Secunda notes, employers and 
employees do not have equal bargaining power.  That is the premise 
of the National Labor Relations Act.57  Moreover, union membership 
                                                                                                                                                    
 51. JOHN D. AYER & MICHAEL L. BERNSTEIN, BANKRUPTCY IN PRACTICE 304 (4th 
ed. 2007). 
 52. 11 U.S.C. § 503(b)(1) (2012). 
 53. Secunda, supra note 2, at 871–72, 891.  This may be an important concern in 
Chapter 7 and non-bankruptcy liquidations.  Some fact-based research on this point 
would be useful. 
 54. See 11 U.S.C. § 1113 (2012) (modification of collective bargaining 
agreements).  Of course, for non-unionized employees, the debtor may do so 
unilaterally. 
 55. See Secunda, supra note 2, at 873–74. 
 56. See generally 3 WILLIAM L. NORTON, JR., BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 
49:21 (3d ed. 2013).  The main exception is in the Second Circuit, where severance 
pay may be deemed to accrue upon termination of employment, rather than ratably 
across an employee’s career. See e.g., Straus-Duparquet, Inc. v. Local Union No. 3 
Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers, 386 F.2d 649 (2d Cir. 1967).  The Fourth Circuit has 
recently reached a similar conclusion with respect to severance during the pre-
petition priority period. See Matson v. Alarcon, 651 F.3d 404 (4th Cir. 2011).  The 
ABI Commission is considering severance pay issues. See Andrew Dawson, Minutes 
of ABI Commission to Study the Reform of Chapter 11, LAB. & BENEFITS ADVISORY 
COMMITTEE (Apr. 19, 2013), available at http://commission.abi.org/sites/default/files/ 
April%2019%20meeting%20minutes.docx, (“Discussion focused on the working 
paper regarding severance issues under section 503.”). 
 57. In enacting the NLRA, Congress found that “[t]he inequality of bargaining 
power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual 
liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms 
of ownership association substantially burdens and affects the flow of 
commerce . . . .” 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2012).  Similarly, in enacting Section 1113 of the 
Bankruptcy Code, Senator Kennedy stated that the law’s intent was to prevent the 
trustee from having unlimited discretionary power to repudiate labor contracts. 130 
CONG. REC. S8898 (daily ed. Jun. 29, 1984).  And, in enacting Section 1114, Congress 
sought to protect the rights of retirees to continue to receive benefits irrespective of 
their employer’s bankruptcy. See In re Arclin U.S. Holding, Inc., 416 B.R. 117, 119 
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has been steadily declining, at least in the private sector.58  And union 
membership has historically been low in the South, for example.59 
That said, unions remain powerful advocates in the legislative 
arena.  Though he mentions one pending bill (Senator Hatch’s 
proposal for a new type of pension platform),60 Professor Secunda has 
not discussed the reforms organized labor has identified as important 
to their constituents. 
For example, much attention has been focused on The Protecting 
Employees and Retirees in Business Bankruptcies Act of 2013 (H.R. 
100), introduced by Representative John Conyers Jr. (D-MI) on 
January 3, 2013.  The bill’s stated purpose is to improve protections 
for employees and retirees in business bankruptcies.61  House Bill 100 
has been referred to the House Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee 
on Regulatory Reform, Commercial and Antitrust Law.62 
Some view House Bill 100 as a “wish list,” and consider it unlikely 
to pass in its current form because it is heavily tilted toward employee 
interests.63   Among other things, the bill would amend the 
Bankruptcy Code to: 
• increase the priority claim for wages, salaries, or commissions, 
including vacation and severance pay; 
                                                                                                                                                    
(Bankr. D. Del. 2009).  Professor Secunda only briefly discusses Sections 1113 and 
1114, but the literature on these provisions is extensive. See generally JOHN D. PENN 
ET AL., LABOR ISSUES IN CHAPTER 11: AN OVERVIEW (2010), available at 
http://www.abiworld.org/committees/newsletters/busreorg/vol9num5/labor.pdf. 
 58. See Steven Greenhouse, Share of the Work Force in a Union Falls to a 97-
Year Low, 11.3%, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/24/ 
business/union-membership-drops-despite-job-growth.html?_r=0. 
 59. See GERALD MAYER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., UNION MEMBERSHIP TRENDS 
IN THE UNITED STATES (2004), available at http://digitalcommons.ilr.cornell.edu/ 
cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1176&context=key_workplace; see also Union Affiliation 
of Employed Wage and Salary Workers by State, BUREAU LAB. STATISTICS, 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.t05.htm (last updated Jan. 24, 2014). 
 60. See Secunda, supra note 2 at 883. 
 61. See Protecting Employees and Retirees in Business Bankruptcies Act, H.R. 
100, 113th Cong. (2013), available at http://beta.congress.gov/bill/113th/house-
bill/100; see also John Conyers, Jr.: A Legislative Record of Jobs, Justice and Peace, 
JOHN CONYERS, JR.: U.S. CONGRESSMAN, 1, 10, http://conyers.house.gov/_cache/files/ 
93cecf79-b4bb-4a41-939c-00302e5a53ca/Executive_Summary_Jobs_Justice_and_ 
Peace.pdf (stating that Rep. Conyers has introduced or cosponsored legislation since 
1987 that has sought to level the playing field for employees and retirees in business 
bankruptcies by requiring heightened standards to reject collective bargaining 
agreements and reduce employee benefits). 
 62. See H.R. 100. 
 63. See e.g., Michael L. Bernstein, Testimony Before the ABI Commission to 
Study the Reform of Chapter 11, AM. BANKR. INST. (March 14, 2013), 
http://commission.abi.org/sites/default/files/statements/14mar2013/Michael_L_Bernst
ein.pdf. 
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• increase the priority claim for contributions to an employee 
benefit plan; 
• include severance pay (other than for insiders, senior 
management, and highly compensated employees) as an 
administrative expense; 
• include damages for WARN Act violations as an 
administrative expense; 
• provide a claim for damages for rejection of a collective 
bargaining agreement under Section 1113.64 
In addition to these “claims” issues, and major reforms to Sections 
1113 and 1114, House Bill 100 would require that in evaluating 
purchase offers, the court consider the extent to which a bidder offers 
to maintain existing jobs, preserve the terms and conditions of 
employment, and assume or match pension and retiree health benefit 
obligation.65  Assuming that solution is realistic, 66 it would 
dramatically change the landscape with respect to unionized 
employees and retirees, as well as the pension insurance system and 
providers of health care coverage. 
The Commission was established to “study and propose reforms to 
Chapter 11 and related statutory provisions that will better balance 
the goals of effectuating the effective reorganization of business 
debtors with the attendant preservation and expansion of jobs . . . .”67  
Its members include lawyers, workout professionals, and academics.68  
At a field hearing in March 2013, the Commission heard testimony 
from management- and union-side witnesses, a retired bankruptcy 
judge and Joshua Gotbaum, the PBGC’s Director.  Gotbaum 
emphasized that the Commission’s charge is to “revisit and rebalance 
                                                                                                                                                    
 64. Protecting Employees and Retirees in Business Bankruptcies Act of 2013, 
H.R. 100, 113th Cong. §§ 101, 103, 105, 201 (2013). 
 65. Id. § 203. See also Judith Greenstone Miller & My Chi To, Legislative 
Update, American Bar Association Business Bankruptcy Committee, Spring Meeting 
of the Business Law Section 1, 5 (Apr. 4, 2013), available at 
http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=5&ved=0CEg
QFjAE&url=http%3A%2F%2Fmeetings.abanet.org%2Fwebupload%2Fcommuplo
ad%2FCL160000%2Frelatedresources%2Flegislativeupdate20130404.doc&ei=Yc7a
UsTVAsrlsASF0oHgCA&usg=AFQjCNHm3jVnX4Ss0CENlWMGlqYR6KX4pg&si
g2=XtDd5b43Nw6md7Wp6HJ86A. 
 66. See Bernstein, supra note 63, at 12 (“The reality is that in many cases there is 
no buyer who is willing to preserve all of the debtor’s employees’ jobs and assume all 
of its pension and retiree liabilities.”). 
 67. Purpose of the Commission, AM. BANKR. INST., http://commission.abi.org/ 
purpose-commission (last visited Mar. 15, 2014). 
 68. See id. 
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Chapter 11, in pursuit of the twin goals of reorganization and just 
treatment of creditors.”69 
Given the ABI’s key role in providing bankruptcy information, the 
Commission’s report could significantly affect the debate.  Professor 
Secunda should find an opportunity to collaborate or to offer his 
services. 
CONCLUSION 
As a resource on comparative employment and bankruptcy law, 
Professor Secunda’s Article will be a valuable addition to the 
literature.  While his proposals to increase priority treatment for 
wages and pension contributions have support among interest groups, 
it is not clear that his proposal for a wage guarantee fund is necessary. 
With this response, I have suggested a need for greater focus on 
protections for ongoing pension plans and the pension insurance 
system (and any wage guarantee fund), the vagaries of legislation, and 
bankruptcy reform efforts already underway.  Scholars and law 
reformers may want to take them into account in their respective 
endeavors. 
                                                                                                                                                    
 69. ABI COMM’N TO STUDY REFORM OF CHAPTER 11, supra note 34, at 1. 
